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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
Patrushev, Gryzlov and power politics in the aftermath 
The terror attack in Moscow constituted more than a simple cry for international 
attention to the Chechen quest for statehood or an attempt to blackmail President 
Vladimir Putin into ending that conflict. By bringing the war to the very steps of 
power in Russia, the terrorists attempted to challenge Putin's political dominance 
in a way that no exiled tycoon or rogue demagogue ever could have done. Putin 
rose to the presidency amid a wave of militant sentiment directed against a 
"lawless" Chechnya in the wake of the 1999 terror attack in Moscow. To have a 
similar but more audacious attack in the capital of the Russian Federation now, 
years after Putin resumed the war in Chechnya, demonstrates the failure of the 
brutal military campaign. Potentially this may undermine Putin's prestige, at least 
in the longer run, not to speak of the reputation of Nikolay Patrushev and Boris 
Gryzlov, the heads of the security services involved. Ultimately, this may benefit 
the officers of the regular military forces under the defense ministry, who have 
never been enamored of FSB and MVD "generals." 
 
The amount of potential political damage to Putin as a result of the attack stood 
in direct relation to the duration of the crisis and its eventual outcome. Several 
Russian political commentators made remarks to this effect in the days prior to 
denouement of the crisis. (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 25 Oct 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
The president spoke to the nation just before meeting with his FSB director, 
Patrushev, and Interior Minister Gryzlov. They were closeted with Putin 
throughout the crisis. (THE RUSSIA JOURNAL, 25 Oct 02; via ISI Emerging 
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Markets Database) In the dramatic finale, both men attempted to score public 
relations points, when the consequences of failure became equally apparent. 
(ITAR-TASS, 26 Oct 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Indeed, more and 
more questions on the clumsiness and the cover-up of the security services may 
cause a backlash. In a subsequent speech, following the storming of the Moscow 
theater, Putin outlined his policy concerning terror and placed great emphasis on 
the regular armed forces as opposed to the security services. He stated, "the 
General Staff will be instructed to amend the deployment plan for the Armed 
Forces due to the growing threat of international terrorism." (NEZAVISIMAYA 
GAZETA, 29oct 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Shortly thereafter 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov called for "a version of the national security 
concept 'in which plans for the use of armed forces will be an integral part and 
must be considered'." (ITAR-TASS, 29 Oct 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
This may constitute the beginning of a decline in Patrushev's and Gryzlov's 
careers, and conversely, a rise in the stature of the defense ministry. The very 
occurrence of such an audacious attack in the heart of Moscow constituted a 
security failure from which it may be difficult to recover. (NEZAVISIMAYA 
GAZETA, 29 Oct 02: via ISI Emerging Markets Database) At the same time, 
Putin has come forward with a plan to strengthen the regular defense ministry 
troops, while reducing their numbers in Chechnya itself. The defense minister 
has concluded that, "pinpoint-accuracy operations will be used against criminal 
formations." (ITAR-TASS, 29 Oct 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) What 
we may be witnessing is a struggle between the defense ministry and the 
security services for the ear of the president. 
 
In any case, both Patrushev and Gryzlov are men of considerable influence 
within Putin's circle, and it is worth looking at the nature of their relationship with 
him prior to the Moscow hostage crisis. 
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At that time, in March 2002, Patrushev's and the FSB's stock was rising. A newly 
constructed Orthodox Christian church was opened for the FSB's use. Both 
Patrushev and the Orthodox Patriarch, Aleksei II, were present at its dedication. 
Although the irony of the KGB's successor agency being honored with such a 
religious dedication is evident, the political implications were also clear. Putin, 
Russian Orthodox himself, is also a veteran of the KGB and the FSB. Funds for 
the church were raised within his security organization. The restoration of the St. 
Sophia Church effectively by the FSB constituted a political signal highlighting a 
new trinity of the State, the Church, and the Special Services. (THE MOSCOW 
TIMES, 7 Mar 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Gryzlov's prestige was enhanced when, following the assassination of the 
Magadan governor, Valentin Tsvetkov, in a televised speech Putin assigned a 
major role in the investigation to Gryzlov together with Vladimir Ustinov, the 
prosecutor-general. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 21 Oct 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) At the time, Gryzlov was reported also to be a potential 
leader of Putin's United Russia Party in the Duma, should its current chairman, 
Aleksandr Bespalov, be removed for speeches targeting some of Putin's allies -- 
specifically Economic Development Minister German Gref and Finance Minister 
Aleksei Kudrin. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 4 Oct 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
Patrushev also had been the focus of media speculation regarding his potential 
ascendancy to the highly influential post as head of the Presidential 
Administration at the expense of Yel'tsin's choice, Aleksandr Voloshin. Such 
promotion would have given immediate and continuous access to the president; 
moreover, he would have had a say concerning who else had access to Putin. 
Gryzlov, on the other hand, has been mentioned as a possible secretary of the 
Security Council should the post open up in the near future. (NOVYE IZVESTIA, 
7 Sep 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The current secretary is the 
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politically impotent Vladimir Rushailo, himself a former Ministry of the Interior 
(MVD) chief. 
 
Both Gryzlov and Patrushev were present at President Putin's recent 50th 
birthday party, a veritable who's who of power and influence in Russia. Absent 
was another competitor, Emergencies Minister Sergei Shoigu. (ITAR-TASS, 7 
Oct 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Should Putin shift emphasis to the defense ministry in the wake of the hostage 
crisis, Patrushev and Gryzlov will not willingly surrender their influence. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Michael Donahue 
 
FSB 
Failure, disgrace and death in Moscow: A victory over terror? 
Surely, someone will pay. Does not someone have to pay? As the internecine 
war in Chechnya continues ad nauseam, Russian President Vladimir Putin will 
have ample opportunity to wreak a measure of revenge for last week's fiasco in a 
Moscow theater -- when 50 Chechen and other terrorists seized control of the 
theater, held more than 700 individuals hostage and demanded Russia end the 
war in Chechnya. Refusing to be cowed into negotiations, Putin's forces stormed 
the theater, and sent a stern message to the Chechens: Your fate is sealed. 
 
The event can only be considered as a major failure for the FSB -- despite years 
of vicious war in Chechnya, a war in which Moscow repeatedly assured the 
public the rebel ranks had been decimated, more than 50 of them were able to 
sneak into the heart of Moscow, armed and (allegedly) loaded with nearly two 
tons of TNT. As the reports of the end of the siege continue to come in, it 
appears obvious that the special services learned nothing from the war in 
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Chechnya nor from Budennovsk nor, for that matter, from the cover-up and lies 
that accompanied the Kursk disaster and the Chernobyl catastrophe. The 
Moscow blunders bring to mind the operation carried out in June 1995 when 
Chechen rebels took several hundred persons hostage in a hospital at 
Budennovsk, in southern Russia - an episode that ended with more than 100 
civilians dying when Russian troops stormed the hospital. (AGENCE-FRANCE 
PRESSE, 25 Oct 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) This weekend 
Muscovites were shaken to see similar results when, as the terrorists' deadline 
approached, Russian forces pumped gas into the theater and stormed the 
building. If one measures the success of the operation solely in terms of whether 
or not the Chechens were killed, as Putin and the FSB predictably do, then this 
weekend's action was as unqualified a success as the Budennovsk operation. If, 
however, one considers the fate of the hostages when analyzing the mission, it 
would be impossible to call the operation, and the security services as a whole, 
anything but a colossal failure. 
 
(The details of this tragic affair are addressed elsewhere in The NIS Observed.) 
 
In addition to the disgraceful performance of the Russian intelligence community 
in apparently failing to monitor the movement of any of the more than four dozen 
uniformed terrorists into the heart of Russia, the ridiculous tactics of the special 
services (tried, tested and found to be inept in Budennovsk seven years before) 
which resulted in nearly twice as many civilians dead as terrorists demand that 
someone pay. 
 
As the FSB is the most culpable agency, one would assume that director Nikolay 
Patrushev would be the first in a long line of resignations, but it is very doubtful 
that anything of the sort will happen. Instead Putin, who following the operation 
boldly declared that "we showed that Russia cannot be forced to her knees," 
predictably may attempt to use this incident to generate support for putative 
increased operations in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge -- an alleged refuge for 
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Chechen terrorists (so Moscow's story goes). Indeed, rather than seek to remedy 
the internal shortcomings highlighted by Russia's hapless resolution of the crisis, 
blame and retribution probably will be sought elsewhere. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Ansel Stein 
 
Iraq, in brief 
Moscow has continued to maintain its opposition to the United States' diplomatic 
campaign in the United Nations against Iraq. As reported by the Russian press, 
on 24 October Moscow rejected a revised version of the American and British 
draft resolution supposedly because it still contained provisions for the automatic 
use of force and assigned what Russia considers to be an impractical mandate to 
the international inspectors. (ITAR-TASS, 23 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1024, via 
World News Connection) The US and Britain were accused of trying to isolate 
Russia, France and China - two of which are overt critics of plans to force action 
against Iraq -- by presenting their resolution to the non-permanent Security 
Council members. (ITAR-TASS, 22 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1022, via World 
News Connection) Both France and Russia have introduced informal draft 
resolutions in response to the latest Anglo-American proposal.  
 
Iran 
Moscow curtailed much of its international agenda, including President Putin's 
trip to the APEC summit in Mexico, in response to the hostage situation in 
Moscow. Prior to this, however, several events of note occurred. Russian and 
Iranian officials met in Moscow on 21 October to discuss issues relating to the 
construction of a nuclear plant in Bushehr. According to the Russian Ministry of 
Atomic Energy, the meeting centered around the issue of returning spent nuclear 
fuel from Iran to Russia. (INTERFAX, 22 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1022, via 
World News Connection) The ministry downplayed a rumored American 
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"economic incentive" of $10 billion to end nuclear cooperation with Iran. "America 
did not make an official proposal to the effect at a Moscow meeting between 
Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev and U.S. Under 
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton last 
week," an atomic energy ministry spokesman said. (INTERFAX, 24 Oct 02; FBIS-
SOV-2002-1024, via World News Connection) Given the wording of the denial, 
however, one may assume an unofficial offer, in fact, has been made. Still, 
Moscow is covering all bases: Russia and Iran also reiterated that they are 
working steadily on the 10-year cooperation program agreed upon in July. The 
co-chairmen of the Russia-Iran intergovernmental commission met to discuss 
remaining (and unspecified) "issues of contention" on 24 October. (INTERFAX, 
24 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1024, via World News Connection) 
 
Rekindling another old flame 
Mozambique's foreign minister, Leonardo dos Santos Simao, arrived in Moscow 
on 16 October to meet with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. According to a 
foreign ministry spokesman, their talks focused on "creating a democratic system 
of international relations and combating modern global challenges, above all, 
threats of international terrorism." During the pre-Yel'tsin period, Mozambique 
and the Soviet Union enjoyed close relations. Reminiscent of that era, the foreign 
ministry spokesman reiterated that "The positions of Russia and Mozambique on 
key problems are either close or coincide." (ITAR-TASS, 16 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-1016, via World News Connection) 
 
Igor of Arabia 
In addition to its activities in support of Iran and Iraq, Moscow has been working 
to improve and expand its influence throughout the Persian Gulf region. Russian 
Foreign Minister Ivanov endorsed publicly a closer relationship with Saudi Arabia, 
noting Moscow's "growing cooperation with Riyadh." Referring to that 
relationship, Ivanov said that the first meeting on 15 October of the 
Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic and Scientific-Technological 
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Cooperation and its related business forum "confirmed the great opportunities for 
expanding bilateral interaction." (ITAR-TASS, 16 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1016, 
via World News Connection) Russia also has been cultivating relations with 
Kuwait in the wake of Arab opposition to US action against Iraq. At a meeting 
between Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Saltanov and a delegation 
of the Kuwaiti National Assembly, led by Deputy Speaker Mishari al-Anjari, it was 
announced that "Kuwait shares Russia's view on the need to settle the problem 
of Iraq by political and diplomatic means." (INTERFAX, 15 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-1015, via World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
The gambit 
As reported in the previous NIS Observed, (16 Oct 02) the Unity Party had 
proposed a drastic increase in the popular vote threshold that political parties and 
blocs are required to pass in order to obtain a proportion of the 225 Duma seats 
available to party lists. The proposal - to amend legislation on political parties by 
raising the bar from the current 5% of the popular vote to 12% -- from the group 
that typically is viewed (by itself and others) as "Putin's party" was all the more 
startling when the Kremlin immediately trashed the idea. The Kremlin's response 
was echoed quickly by leaders of several parties. 
 
With a clear lack of support for the proposal, what could the proponents in the 
Unity Party have been thinking? A cynical observer could imagine that no one 
ever had any intention of discussing a 12% threshold, and that the original 
proposal was merely a ploy to make a smaller increase - but an increase 
nonetheless - more palatable. Certainly, within days, both houses of parliament, 
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the Kremlin and the chairman of the Central Election Commission (CEC) all had 
backed a plan to raise the threshold to 7%, with barely a whimper heard, for 
parliamentary elections due to be held in 2007. The Duma passed the amended 
bill in the second reading on 25 October with a vote of 344 in favor, 31 against 
and 3 abstentions. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 25 Oct 02) 
 
This amendment would constitute a continuation of the administration's 
"streamlining" of the political process that began in 2001 with the law on political 
parties, which effectively winnowed the 200-odd parties then extant to a 
significantly smaller number. Debates at the time featured the warning that the 
restrictions then proposed, such as minimum membership of 10,000 individuals 
and strict rules on party financing, might create a parliament consisting only of a 
pro-Putin faction and a Communist opposition. (DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, 1407 CET, 24 May 01; via lexis-nexis) Interestingly enough, the 
same warnings ensued when the 12%-threshold proposal was floated... but not 
during debates on the lower increase. 
 
Ramifications 
What would an increased threshold mean to the existing party lineup in the 
Duma? Based on the December 1999 elections, the expectations of a two-party 
parliament are not far-fetched: Unity and the Communist Party (KPRF) would 
overcome easily even the initially proposed 12% barrier; Fatherland - All Russia 
bloc won 13%, but has since become virtually invisible on the political landscape; 
the Union of Right Forces (SPS) led by Boris Nemtsov garnered 9%; while 
Grigory Yavlinsky's YABLOKO and Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDPR) each received 6% of the votes. (ITAR-TASS, 29 Dec 99; via lexis-
nexis) More recent polling, via the All-Russia Public Opinion Center, indicated 
that Putin's popularity remained high (73% in July), while that of political party 
leaders was as follows: Sergei Shoigu (Unity) - 18%, Gennady Zyuganov (KPRF) 
- 14%, Zhirinovsky (LDPR) - 8%, Yavlinsky (YABLOKO) - 6%, and Boris 
Nemtsov (Union of Right Forces) - 6%. (INTERFAX, 0747 GMT, 1 Aug 02; FBIS-
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SOV-2002-0801, via World News Connection) If one were to use the party 
leaders' popularity to extrapolate the population's support of the parties 
themselves, three political groupings face the possibility of not reaching the 
proposed new minimum, two of them precisely the more democratic elements in 
the Duma. 
 
Of course, the possibility of cooperative agreements remains. The Union of Right 
Forces (SPS) and YABLOKO have maintained a tenuous relationship for years, 
but problems concerning personality rather than policy have prevented the two 
parties from merging. While SPS has absorbed much of YABLOKO's 
membership, Yavlinsky remains, in his own mind at least, more of a leader than a 
follower. When SPS proposed that the 20 democratic parties and group 
comprising the All-Russia Democratic Conference submit a single nominee for 
the next election, Yavlinsky's tenaciously (and successfully) demanded that the 
joint nominee not be named until after the 2003 parliamentary elections - when 
he will learn how much influence he retains with the voters. (ITAR-TASS, 1621 
GMT, 21 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1021, via World News Connection) 
 
During the debates, CEC Chairman Aleksandr Veshnyakov assured worried 
parliamentarians that the proposed threshold increase could be suspended - 
briefly - to ensure that at least three parties would fill the Duma. (ITAR-TASS, 
0959 GMT, 11 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1011, via World News Connection) 
Given how close the SPS, LDPR and YABLOKO are to the threshold, it seems 
that their leaders might view the proposed amendment as a convenient way to 
edge out some competition. Political egos rarely acknowledge the chance of 
losing. 
 
Workers of the world, disband? 
Meanwhile, other political leaders are working feverishly to ensure that their 
parties do not implode, in order to get through next year's elections. Following a 
newspaper interview in which oligarch-in-exile Boris Berezovsky entertained the 
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notion of a merger of left-wing and liberal opposition elements, an idea with 
which the co-chairman of the (by no means liberal) Union of Popular Patriotic 
Forces, Aleksandr Prokhanov, reportedly agreed, Duma Speaker Gennady 
Seleznev warned that the Rossiya movement he heads might withdraw from the 
union. (ITAR-TASS, 1821 GMT, 13 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1013, via World 
News Connection)  
 
Indeed, Berezovsky's attempt to remain politically active from afar had a result 
that differed from what, apparently, he had hoped: The oligarch was ousted from 
the Liberal Russia Party, while the Communist Party and the Union of Patriotic 
Forces denied that any such cooperation with -- or financial support from -- him, 
would be accepted. (INTERFAX, 0938 GMT, 15 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1015, 
via World News Connection) In a move unlikely to be considered a coincidence, 
following Berezovsky's ouster the justice ministry decided that the numerous 
irregularities and inconsistencies that the ministry had cited as a reason for 
denying Liberal Russia's registration didn't exist after all, and granted the party's 
registration request. (INTERFAX, 1730 GMT, 17 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1017, 
via World News Connection)  
 
Berezovsky's ill-advised move showed increased weakening of the opposition. 
Putin seems to be facing less and less resistance from the "usual suspects." 
YABLOKO, long a voice of (at times querulous) opposition, has been viewed in 
recent months as supportive of the president's administration. (NEZAVISIMAYA 
GAZETA, 2 Jul 02; via lexis-nexis) Many members of SPS are concerned chiefly 
with economic reforms, and so are somewhat manageable, provided Putin 
throws them some sops. While a merger of ideologically opposed parliamentary 
blocs, à la Berezovsky, clearly is absurd, the diminishing opposition does need to 
take a hard look at the situation before it accepts its own demise. The Kremlin 
seems to have found the perfect cocktail - appealing to political self-interest, co-
optation and, when necessary, the judicious use of ministerial prerogatives - to 
put the opposition into a stupor. 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Steve Kwast and Dan Rozelle 
 
Is Russia creating the next Iraq? 
Recent events may point to the fact that Iran is the next major threat to regional 
security in the Middle East, and Russia is fueling the problem. On 20 October, 
Iranian elements in Lebanon received the Zelzal-2 missile system capable of 
carrying over 1,000 pounds of chemical, biological, nuclear or conventional 
weapons as far as Tel Aviv (a range of 150 miles). Once fired, the missiles would 
reach Tel Aviv in just a couple of minutes. For the first time, Iran is capable of 
targeting main cities and military installations in Israel; this acquisition has 
changed the strategic balance in the region. Iran didn't get this capability on its 
own. Russia played a major role in their ability to gain this military advantage. 
[THE TIMES (LONDON), 20 Oct 02; via lexis-nexis] 
 
This latest development is only the "tip of the iceberg." For years Moscow has 
been supplying military goods and services to help arm Tehran. Over the last two 
decades, Russia has sold Iran countless weapons such as anti-aircraft defenses, 
firearms, armored vehicles and anti-tank weapons. (AGENCE-FRANCE 
PRESSE, 23 Sep 02; WPS Defense and Security, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) Even more worrisome are the dual-use technologies that Russia has 
given to Iran both directly and through other countries (such as Ukraine) which 
profit from the transfer of knowledge and equipment to rogue states. Recent 
taped conversations between Ukraine's President Leonid Kuchma and the 
director of Ukraine's largest rocket maker, Yuri Alexeev, indicate that Ukraine 
supplied Russian rocket technology to Iran that surely helped that country 
achieve this most recent capability. (FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), 21 Oct 02; 
via lexis-nexis)  
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Russia also is actively engaged with Iran on nuclear development, helping the 
Islamic republic to build a nuclear reactor at Bushehr on the Gulf. This assistance 
has blossomed into Russia promising five nuclear reactors over the next few 
years. (AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 21 Oct 02; WPS Defense and Security, via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) The West is concerned because the Bushehr 
project, and a flood of additional nuclear support assets, could provide a conduit 
for Russian nuclear specialists to be recruited into Iran's nuclear military effort. 
(THE WASHINGTON TIMES, 27 Jul 02) 
 
In this month's International Arms Export Conference held in Warsaw, Russian 
officials talked about the need to control exports of so-called dual-application 
goods, but went no further than to claim that nuclear technologies it supplies 
would be used only for peaceful purposes. (RZECZPOSPOLITA, 4 Oct 02; FBIS-
NES-2002-1011, via World News Connection) However, Moscow's sales of dual-
application goods to rogue states, with no strings attached, speak louder than 
words. Russian officials reportedly refuse to take seriously the potential that Iran 
could use nuclear knowledge for military purposes. (THE BOSTON GLOBE, 19 
May 02) Russia also is turning a blind eye to the dangers that Iran can pose to 
the region. Yakov Bravoy, the director general of ITAR-TASS international 
department, recently pointed to Iran as a pivotal regional state and said he saw 
signs for optimism with regard to Tehran's upcoming international forum: "Given 
that the forum marks Iran's orientation towards peace, it cannot be accused of 
supporting terrorism," he said. (IRNA, 1606 GMT, 9 Oct 02; FBIS-NES-2002-
1009, via World News Connection) 
 
Nothing could be farther from the truth. For decades, Iran has been articulating 
its hatred of the West and its willingness to use force to deliver its notion of 
justice. It also blames Israel and America for Iraq's eight-year war against Iran. In 
a recent newspaper article, Iran officially called America the "Great Satan" and 
pointed to the so-called "accidental" US missile attack on the Iranian AirBus 
(killing 300), the eight-year Iraqi war and US attacks on Iran's marine terminals 
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as reasons to fight. "American soil [has become] the safe haven and sanctuary 
for all the terrorists whose hands were stained with the blood of our innocent 
people and prominent figures everywhere in our country." (TEHRAN DAILY, 24 
Sep 02; FBIS-NES-2002-0924, via World News Connection) 
 
Iran has shown clearly its intent to use force. Now Russia has provided the 
means to use force (in the form of the Zelzal-2 missile system) and the potential 
to develop nuclear weapons (with the contract to build five nuclear reactors). It 
would be wise to keep an eye on Iran and not become so focused solely on Iraq 
that the danger signs from its neighbors to the east are missed. 
 
Russia is concentrating on its short-term material self-interest without regard to 
potential consequences. While funding is a major motivation, (see THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 11 Sep 02) politics and strategy also play a part. On 3 October, 
Russian President Putin explained the connection of trade to status at a session 
of the Commission for Technological Cooperation: "The strengthening of 
Russia's political and economic position depends directly on the success of its 
technological ties." (INTERFAX, 1613 GMT, 3 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1003, via 
World News Connection)  
 
Moscow also is motivated by potential regional influence. One man who has 
been on the inside of Russian strategic planning over the past decade, Colonel-
General Leonid Ivashov (now vice president of the geopolitical studies academy), 
was interviewed recently by the Russian press. When asked about Iran he 
indicated that the appearance of US troops in Central Asia now requires Russia 
to stay engaged in the region militarily, politically and economically to the 
maximum extent possible. (WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, 21 Oct 02; via lexis-
nexis) These two statements support the latest trend in Moscow to sell as much 
as possible to any state that will open up its pocket book. (See THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 11 Sep 02) It is a trend that is creating greater and greater concern, 
especially because of countries such as Iran. 
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It could be argued that the Iranians have the same desire to use weapons of 
mass destruction as Iraq. They are, without question, closer to possessing the 
technology and materials to produce nuclear weapons. To treat them as no 
threat would be to turn a blind eye to the facts. Combining Iran's nuclear 
potential, delivery vehicle capability and the current political environment in the 
Middle East, creates the recipe for disaster, and Russia must take a share of 
responsibility. Moscow's blatant disregard for the geopolitical consequences of its 
military and dual-use technologies sales may create the next major crisis in the 
region. 
 
Putin fires Black Sea Fleet Commander 
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree to end a very public dispute 
between Russian Navy Commander Vladimir Kuroedov and Black Sea Fleet 
Commander Vladimir Komoedov. The decree, issued on 9 October, dismissed 
Komoedov from service although reportedly he was quite successful in his 
position. Only the president can appoint and dismiss fleet commanders in the 
Russian Navy. 
 
The dispute began in June when Kuroedov ordered Komoedov relieved of duty 
based on a post-operative medical examination. The Medical Commission of the 
Defense Ministry declared Komoedov "fit for military service with limitations but 
unfit for service on ships." (WPS OBSERVER, 19 Jul 02; What the Papers Say, 
via ISI Defense and Security Database) However, military doctors did allow 
Komoedov to go to sea for up to three months. In an attempt to keep his position, 
Komoedov filed a suit in military court against Kuroedov, noting the contradiction 
of being declared "unfit for service on ships" yet being allowed to serve at sea for 
limited stretches. Kuroedov offered Komoedov the position of commander of the 
St. Petersburg Naval Academy, but Komoedov refused the post and the case 
became sensationalized in the media as a personal conflict between the two 
admirals. (TRUD, 10 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1009, via World News Connection) 
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While the two officers reportedly have disliked each other for some time, the 
catalyst for the dismissal seems to be the argument between Komoedov and 
Kuroedov over the transfer of several vessels from the Black Sea Fleet to the 
Ukrainian Navy. Others believe that Komoedov sympathized with left-wing 
political movements and had become too rebellious. (NEZAVISIMOE VOENNOE 
OBOZRENIE, 18-24 Oct 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security 
Database) Ultimately Komoedov's medical problems presented a convenient 
means for his removal. 
 
Putin's eventual action was most likely dictated by the growing media interest in 
the court case and his relationship with Kuroedov. Putin did not dismiss 
Kuroedov as the Navy commander after the Kursk sinking and had attended 
Kuroedov's presentation of his scientific thesis. (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 10 Oct 
02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) 
 
Komoedov's replacement, appointed by President Putin, is 55-year-old Vice 
Admiral Vladimir Masorin, who previously commanded the Caspian Flotilla with 
considerable success. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 10 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
1010, via World News Connection) As commander, Masorin will have to deal with 
the problems unique to the Black Sea Fleet, due to its location in Sevastopol, 
Ukraine. The Russian sailors stationed there suffer several hardships related to 
foreign basing which include lack of housing, difficulty in obtaining Russian 
passports and salaries paid in Ukrainian hryvnas. (VREMYA MN, 10 Oct 02; 
What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) 
 
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
Monopoly lost 
Rosoboronexport, Russia's state-run military arms export company, has been 
shot down in its bid to achieve complete monopolization of Russian foreign 
weapons sales. Established only two years ago, Rosoboronexport controlled 
87% ($3.2 billion) of the $3.67 billion in military sales in 2001 and clearly was 
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aiming at control of the remaining portion as well. However, on 3 October, the 
Russian government's committee for military-technical cooperation met with 
President Putin and decided that military-industrial holdings can conduct foreign 
trade operations and export their products independently.  
 
At present six other companies (MiG, Antei, the Design Bureau of Machine 
Building, the Design Bureau of Equipment Industry, the Scientific-Industrial 
Organization of Machine Building and Rubin Central Design Bureau for Naval 
Equipment) hold licenses to export weapons produced by Russia's various 
manufacturers and compete directly with Rosoboronexport. (KOMMERSANT, 5 
Oct 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Russian Political Monitor Database) 
 
Prior to this announcement Rosoboronexport had been on pace to achieve a 
record $4.2 billion in sales for 2002 and was aggressively trying to broaden its 
control beyond being simply the agent for arms sales. The company saw three 
initiatives as key to ensuring primacy. First, it tried to control the sale of spare 
parts and after-sale servicing of military equipment, rights which individual 
manufacturers that could not export finished products had retained. 
Rosoboronexport, however, had established the subsidiary Prompostavka to 
control this profitable portion of the business. (KOMMERSANT, 5 Oct 02; What 
the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) Rosoboronexport also is 
trying to prevent foreign companies from carrying out upgrades and/or 
modernization of Russian-built weapons, combat vehicles and aircraft. General 
Director of Rosoboronexport Andrei Belyaninov has claimed that companies 
conducting these programs are violating the copyrights of Russian arms 
manufacturers and that the upgrades are of low quality. Lastly, and perhaps most 
telling, is the desire to establish control over the plants that actually manufacture 
the military products. Belyaninov stated that "Sharing the capital stock of 
enterprises operating on our contracts is our strategic goal." (VREMYA 
NOVOSTEI, 22 Aug 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security 
Database) 
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Putin's decision, however, along with previous decrees that permit the 
establishment of integrated defense companies within Russia's military-industrial 
sector, stands to have a significant negative impact on Rosoboronexport's plans. 
Already three holdings -- involving Sukhoi aviation, Almaz-Antei air defense 
concern and Tactical Missile Weapons - have been established. Almaz-Antei is 
licensed to conduct foreign sales and Sukhoi may soon gain such a license as 
well. Since, more than 50% of its sales consist of Sukhoi aircraft and other air 
defense weapons, Rosoboronexport stands to lose a significant amount of 
revenue. Eventually, Rosoboronexport may disappear as producers directly 
export their weapons and other military equipment. (KOMMERSANT, 5 Oct 02; 
What the Papers Say, via ISI Russian Business Monitor Database) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Nadezda Kinsky 
 
UKRAINE 
Legal nihilism 
In the last two weeks the continuing opposition protests have achieved a new 
dimension by sparking a controversy in the realm of law in Ukraine. After the 
"People's Tribunal" of 12 October sentenced President Leonid Kuchma to "the 
highest form of people's punishment - public condemnation" on 24 counts, (see 
WWW.PRAVDA.COM.UA) oppositionists politicians Oleksandr Moroz, Yuliya 
Tymoshenko, Grigory Omelchenko, Yosif Vinsky and Oleksandr Turnichov 
applied for a legal case to be opened against the president with the Kyiv Court of 
Appeals. Against general expectation, Yuriy Vaylenko opened the case on 15 
October, charging Kuchma with the violation of 11 articles of the Criminal Code, 
based on documents from the parliamentary commission set up to investigate the 
Gongadze murder and on the Melnychenko tapes, which had been delivered to 
him by opposition MPs. However, the judge is not under any illusions as to the 
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effectiveness of his action: In an interview published by Ukrayina Moloda, 
Vasylenko showed his realistic side. In response to a question about the legal 
consequences he expects, he said: "None, of course. I opened the case, they will 
close it." When asked whether he believes the case will take its legal course 
unhampered by interference from Kuchma: "Do I look like an idiot? Of course I 
don't believe that." (UKRAYINA MOLODA, 17 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1017, via 
World News Connection) 
 
The administration's immediate response on 15 October was hardly surprising. 
Spokeswoman Olena Hrmonytska called the case "illegal and anticonstitutional," 
and described Kuchma as "emotionally bewildered." Viktor Medvechuk, the head 
of the presidential administration, described the situation as "legal nihilism" and a 
"manifestation of judicial defiance of the law." Minister of Justice Oleksandr 
Lavrynovych summed up the reasoning against the case quite neatly: "The very 
fact of opening the criminal case is quite controversial... under the constitution 
people's deputies and the president are untouchable." More to the point, 
however, is his admission that there is a "slight problem" with the impeachment 
process: Procedures for such a process are not in place. (INTERFAX, 15 Oct 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-1015, via World News Connection)  
 
The case cannot simply be deemed illegal and closed; the Supreme Court must 
review it. Prosecutor-General Svyatoslav Piskun lodged an appeal for such a 
review by the court on 16 October. As opposition protests continued outside the 
court building in favor of hearing the case, the Supreme Court sent it back to the 
Court of Appeals "to bring the appeal in order with current legislation." Not 
surprisingly, the prosecutor-general doesn't seem to be satisfied with that 
decision. He maintains that prosecution of the country's president -- while he is in 
office - is unconstitutional. He disagrees with Justice Minister Lavryovych, 
however, that there is no practical procedure for removing the president from 
office. He cited article 111 of the Constitution, which establishes the necessary 
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ad hoc committee to decide on impeachment and allows the Supreme Court to 
rule as to whether the president has committed any criminal offense. 
 
On 16 October, the Supreme Court ruled that the February 2002 bill on "Rules 
and Amendments to the Constitution" was in compliance with the Constitution. 
(INTERFAX, 17 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1017, via World News Connection) This 
bill includes regulations on impeachment of the president by a two-thirds 
parliamentary majority. Such a vote is highly unlikely, however. The opposition 
still is calling for the president's resignation or impeachment; the last resolution 
was signed by protesters on 19 October, the "mournful anniversary" of ten years 
of Kuchma's rule. Four days later Moroz again issued such a call for 
impeachment in order to "enable citizens to control the authorities." (INTERFAX, 
23 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1023, via World News Connection) Former Prime 
Minister Viktor Yushchenko, though, continues his fence sitting: He distanced 
himself clearly from the idea of impeachment, claiming that this would throw 
Ukraine into a deep crisis. In a meeting with the Union of Right Forces in Russia, 
he and his Russian colleagues argued against an enforced removal of the 
president, saying that Kuchma should be allowed to stay in office until the end of 
his term in 2004, lest Ukraine suffer even more than now as a result of a political 
crisis accompanying an impeachment process. In the words of the Russian Irina 
Khakamova: "We do not support Kuchma, but his resignation would be a 
catastrophe for Ukraine." (INTERFAX, 22 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1022, via 
World News Connection) Irina Gerachenko, press secretary of Our Ukraine, 
called the "mass media coverage" of those statements "incorrect" and "distorted," 
(IBID.) but the basic stance seems unlikely to change. Yushchenko's fear of 
political upheaval has led him to continue his balancing act between opposition 
and pro-presidential factions ever since the protests erupted, and he does not 
seem likely to change his strategy.  
 
An even greater surprise than the case having been opened in the first place 
would be to see it ending in any positive result. 
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BELARUS 
One step too far? 
The union plans of Russia and Belarus seemed to be continuing smoothly until 
about a week ago; interestingly, the blow against unification did not emanate 
from those opposed to it, but from Minsk itself.  
 
On 22 October, Boris Nemtsov and Irina Khakamada of Russia's Union of Right 
Forces made their way to Minsk to attend the opposition conference, "Belarus-
Russia: New Integration." They never arrived at the conference, though - 
Nemtsov was detained and subsequently deported by Belarusian authorities, and 
Khakamada chose to go back to Russia with him. The official justification for 
Nemtsov's ouster was his alleged plan to "destabilize the situation in Belarus." 
Nemtsov and Khakamada allegedly were carrying literature and money to 
support opposition and anti-unification forces in Belarus - in a folder that 
Nemtsov afterwards repeatedly stated was planted on him as he deplaned in 
Minsk. Among the materials were flyers asking about the disappearance and 
murders of several Belarusian figures from the legal, political and journalistic 
professions - an issue that recently also has received renewed attention from 
within Belarus and from abroad. There is no doubt that Nemtsov is not a big fan 
of the Minsk administration. Recently published transcripts of illegally taped 
telephone conversations revealed Nemtsov's opposition to Belarusian President 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka and the union plans. (Nemtsov has since described his 
opinion to be in line with Putin's idea of a union state along the lines of the EU 
model.) 
 
On 23 October, after the first reactions of outrage arrived from Moscow, the 
Belarus State Secretary for the Union State of Russia and Belarus, Pavel 
Borodin, maintained that the two ousted Duma members "have an anti-state, 
anti-Belarusian and on the whole destructive position" with regard to the Russia-
Belarus union. The Belarus State Security Committee said that "Boris Nemtsov 
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arrived on a private visit and was offered to leave the country in accordance with 
national legislation." Incidentally, protest demonstrations erupted at the Minsk 
opposition conference center quite without the need for outside "provocation" and 
several participants in the demonstrations reportedly were arrested. 
 
This incident undoubtedly will damage Russian relations with Belarus. All 
analysts agree that, in this instance, Lukashenka has overstepped the mark. 
Although Lukashenka claimed that "this incident will have no effect on 
Belarusian-Russian relations," (INTERFAX, 24 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1024, via 
World News Connection) Moscow reacted somewhat unexpectedly. Aleksei 
Gromov, Putin's press secretary, spoke of the Kremlin being "bewildered and 
concerned," (ITAR-TASS, 23 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1023, via World News 
Connection) while the foreign ministry commented that the incident had "cast a 
shadow on the process of building the union state" and that it "could lead to a 
negative attitude of the Russian public towards the Belarusian authorities." 
Belarus authorities are still trying to justify the incident, which Nemtsov termed a 
"cheap provocation marking the death-pangs of Lukashenka's police regime." 
(IBID.) Respublica, the Belarusian opposition group that had awaited Nemtsov's 
visit, has demanded a full investigation into the incident. (BELAPAN, 24 Oct 02; 
via lexis-nexis) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
The raid 
As we post this article, the number of Moscow hostages who have died from gas 
poisoning stands at 118 and may surpass 200, over 400 individuals remain 
hospitalized. (WWW.NEWS.RU, 28 Oct 02) Russian authorities are refusing to 
tell the doctors just which gas was used, thwarting efforts to treat the poisoned. 
German doctors who are treating hospitalized German hostages think that it was 
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Fentanyl, a form of which can be used in anesthesia, and that the fatalities were 
caused by the huge dose pumped into the theater. [THE TIMES (LONDON), 29 
Oct 02]  
 
Two hostages were shot by their captors during the three-day ordeal, in which 
Chechen terrorists seized a Moscow theater and held nearly 800 persons 
hostage until Russian special forces stormed the building early on Saturday 
morning, 26 October. The Chechens had mined the building and threatened to 
blow themselves up together with their captives in the event of a raid. According 
to hostage testimony, at roughly 2 a.m. on Saturday a hostage who had panicked 
and attempted to run for an exit was killed and two others were accidentally 
wounded. However, it seems that, despite the Chechen threat, hostages were 
not being executed. (See chronology on WWW.POLIT.RU, 29 Oct 02) 
 
It is not entirely clear what precisely prompted the authorities to begin the assault 
on the theater. Starting about 5 a.m. on 26 October, Russian security services 
introduced an unidentified poisonous gas into the theater; an FSB special unit, 
Alpha, stormed the theater about an hour and half later. According to 
Kommersant, the gas was issued to Alpha immediately prior to the raid and is not 
part of the unit's tool kit. The FSB's Alpha team led the raid and had been 
administered the antidote, perhaps Naloxone or Narcan. The MVD's SOBR team 
which followed Alpha was not given the antidote (neither were the hostages) and 
the members of the unit were seized with vomiting fits as soon as they entered 
the theater. (KOMMERSANT, 28 Oct 02) 
 
By the time the raid began, the Chechens were incapacitated and unable to 
attempt detonating the explosives. Nevertheless, all the terrorists were shot dead 
on the spot. A member of the Alpha group told Kommersant, "we were afraid they 
would come to and set off the explosions or have convulsions, so we used 
control shots." (KOMMERSANT, 28 Oct 02) It is not clear why Alpha and SOBR 
decided to forego the opportunity to arrest many incapacitated hostage takers. If 
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taken alive they could have provided important information about the 
organization and sponsorship of the raid, not to speak of revealing how 42 of 
them in camouflage uniforms, with rifles, mines, and explosive belts, could have 
cruised undetected across Moscow in three Jeeps. Another unanswered 
question is why did most of the hostage takers wear face masks if they did not 
intend to make a getaway? 
 
The Chechen unit was headed by Movsar Baraev, nephew of the infamous Arbi 
Baraev, who had earned the mocking title "general of the slave trade" from 
journalist Sanobar Shermatova, who has been investigating the group for five 
years for MOSKOVSKY NOVOSTI. (29 Oct 02) Arbi Baraev's Islamic Special 
Forces (IPON) made a name for itself with kidnappings and cruelty - not in actual 
combat. Baraev did not distinguish himself in the first war, but he did have close 
ties to the Islamist propagandist Movladi Udugov (who now runs the kavkaz.org 
web site from Qatar) and to (the late) Dzhokhar Dudaev's Vice President 
Zelimkhan Yanderbiev, who served as president after Dudaev was assassinated 
and now also resides in Qatar. According to Shermatova, in 1997 Yanderbiev 
gave Arbi Baraev his starting capital of $200,000, to finance the IPON.  
 
Throughout 1997 and 1998, Baraev was associated with several of the highest-
profile kidnappings of journalists and the beheading of four foreign telecom 
workers in December 1998. Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov had ordered 
IPON to be liquidated in July 1998 but was unable to have the command 
executed. In December, after the beheadings, Maskhadov had mobilized the 
Chechen reserves, but again was not able to deal a decisive blow to the dreaded 
"Baraevtsy." "By this time," writes Shermatova," the rumors first appeared that 
the general of the slave trade had high-level mentors in Moscow, without whom 
his bloody business would have been impossible."  
 
Once the war began, such suspicions multiplied. According to Shermatova's local 
Chechen sources, Arbi lived openly in Russian-occupied Alkhan-Kala. He drove 
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his own car throughout the republic and crossed checkpoints with the aid of MVD 
identification. "A Chechen journalist who was hot on Baraev's trail was able to 
write down the identification number. Thereupon he was detained by a Russian 
security service unit. He sat in a pit for three days until his acquaintances from 
another Russia security service were able to secure his release." Bareav's 
identification number and all his other notes were seized from the journalist 
during the arrest. 
 
Arbi Baraev was killed in June 2001 in a special operation conducted by the joint 
efforts of GRU and ethnic Chechens who had a blood feud with him. "On 23 June 
2001 Baraev was taken captive by Chechen krovniki who were working with a 
special detachment of GRU [the Main Investigative Department of the General 
Staff]. The Chechens had to storm the commandant's office at Alkhan-Kala 
where Baraev was hiding together with his guards. After their capture, Baraev 
and four of his associates were questioned by GRU officers for 11 hours and this 
was captured on videotape. Then Baraev and his men were shot. Subsequently 
the Chechens who had taken part in the capture of Baraev were killed under 
mysterious circumstances." 
 
After Arbi's death, Movsar Suleimanov took his uncle's last name and became 
the new leader of IPON. He and other members of the gang continued to live 
unhampered in Russian-occupied Alkhan-Kala and busied themselves by 
assassinating fellow Chechens, members of the pro-Russian administration. 
Movsar was not known for any particular leadership or military talents -- he owed 
his position to his uncle. Shermatova's sources doubt that Movsar independently 
could have commanded the raid on the Moscow theater. Moreover, Shermatova 
writes that Movsar probably was being used by others and "he could use his 
uncle's Moscow connections to prepare the terrorist act." The real organizers of 
the hostage-taking should be sought among Udugov's and Yanderbiev's 
associates, Shermatova suggests. 
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During last week's raid, Baraev had demanded an end to the war and the 
withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. He was not permitted to appear in 
the Russian media, but did receive many visitors. Excluding representatives of 
the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, and other medical personnel, the list of 
persons who entered the building to speak with the hostage-takers includes: 
Duma deputies Aslanbek Aslakhanov, Boris Nemtsov, Irina Khakamada, Grigory 
Yavlinsky and Lorsif Kobzon; journalists Mark Franchetti and Anna 
Politkovskaya; Former Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov; former President of 
Ingushetia Ruslan Aushev; and a singer, Alla Pugacheva. (See EKHO MOSKVY, 
WWW.ECHOMSK.RU, WWW.POLIT.RU, and WWW.NTV.RU for detailed 
chronologies of the events of the three days.) None of these personalities was 
authorized to conduct negotiations and none has commented on whether the 
hostage takers were willing to settle for something less than their initial demands. 
 
Consequences 
The crisis demonstrates that the war has not accomplished its purported goal of 
fighting terrorism. If one believes that the explosions in Russian buildings in 
September 1999, which triggered the present war, were the work of Chechen 
terrorists, then the present crisis shows that three years of war have not been 
effective. If one believes that the FSB and GRU, rather than Chechens, were 
behind the initial explosions, then as a result of the war the Chechen side has 
degraded substantially, stooping to the level of terrorism. Whatever the initial 
presupposition about the origins of this war, it was becoming clearly unpopular. 
According to VTsIOM opinion polling, 57% would opt for holding negotiations 
over continuing the war. And for all of 2002, at least half of the Russian 
population has opposed the war. (See VTsIOM data posted on WWW.POLIT.RU, 
26 Oct 02) Memorial has reiterated its call to negotiations with the elected 
executive and parliamentary representatives of Chechnya, who had been 
recognized by Russia prior to the war. (WWW.MEMO.RU, 24 Oct 02) 
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However, in the short term the security services are set to maximize their 
advantage. President Vladimir Putin abstained from political comments during 
the crisis as well as in his television appearance on 26 October, during which he 
asked forgiveness that "we were not able to save them all" and declared a 
national day of mourning. However, only two days later he was insisting that the 
terrorist act demands greater military response; he ordered the military to draw 
up new plans against what he termed "increasingly bold, more cruel" methods 
used by "terrorists." "If anyone tries to use such methods against our country, 
Russia will retaliate with commensurate measures against terrorists and their 
ideological and financial backing wherever they may be," Putin said in televised 
remarks. "Russia will never make any deals with terrorists and will never give in 
to blackmail," Putin vowed. (AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 28 Oct 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) On the following day, Putin instructed the Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanov to rewrite the National Security Concept to authorize 
greater use of the military. Ivanov also commented that Russian plans for 
Chechnya remained unchanged - a Chechen MVD would take over for the 
military, which should be gradually withdrawn. (WWW.NEWSRU.COM, 29 Oct 
02) This plan has been articulated at least half a dozen times by senior officials 
over the last year, but has not been implemented.  
 
Ironically, in what was supposed to be their heroic moment, representatives of 
the security services still acted like blundering bullies. The services not only 
withheld information about which gas was being used; the doctors were not even 
told that a gas was used at all. The emergency personnel, therefore, were not 
prepared for treating gas victims - doctors and nurses thought they would tend to 
bullet and shrapnel wounds. It seems that some hospitals eventually were 
administering some antidote to the victims whereas others were not. 
(WWW.NEWS.RU, 28 Oct 02) For the first day the doctors were told to diagnose 
heart failure or respiratory failure as the cause of death and avoid references to 
gas. (WWW.NEWSRU.COM, 28 Oct 02) Family members waited outside clinics 
and were not permitted access to the victims.  
 28 
 
The media have come under increasing scrutiny as some calls to introduce 
censorship were aired. The press ministry threatened to revoke Ekho Moskvy's 
radio broadcasting license for allowing Movsar Baraev on air. The station's 
website was closed down briefly on 25 October but was allowed to resume 
functioning after the transcript of the interview was removed. 
(WWW.ECHOMSK.RU, 25 Oct 02) Similarly, on 24 October the authorities 
jammed the connection when a hostage who was on the telephone with an NTV 
talk show handed the phone over to one of her captors. 
 
There are reports that police have started searching dormitory rooms of Chechen 
students in Moscow and that mandatory fingerprinting of all Chechens is about to 
be implemented throughout Russia. Several beatings of Caucasians have been 
reported in Moscow, but so far it seem like nothing on the scale of police brutality 
that occurred in September 1999, when thousands of Chechens and other 
Caucasians were arrested at random throughout the city. This time it seems that 
Caucasians stayed home to avoid being caught up in police sweeps or skinhead 
attacks.  
 
Did Maskhadov know? 
It is not surprising that Russian officials are accusing President Maskhadov of 
involvement in the organization of the hostage-taking operation in Moscow. The 
surprise is that this time there may be some truth to it. 
 
"Baraev said that this is a joint action by Maskhadov and Basaev and that they 
are here by their order," Sunday Times reporter Mark Franchetti told Moscow 
Echo radio after meeting Baraev on Thursday night. (AGENCE-FRANCE 
PRESSE, 25 Oct 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) On 24 October, 
Maskhadov's representative, Akhmed Zakaev, said that "Maskhadov tried 'until 
the last minute' to restrain the armed forces subordinate to him from taking such 
radical action, but that 'what was bound to happen, happened,' according to 
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Chechenpress.com." (This statement subsequently was removed from the 
Chechenpress.com website. For Zakaev's quote, see RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 25 
Oct 02) On 25 October, Zakaev issued a clarification saying that Maskhadov was 
not aware in advance of the terrorists' plans.  
 
On the eve of the raid, Maskhadov gave an interview to Chechenpress.com in 
which he claimed to be in control of all Chechen forces, including a handful of 
Arabs fighting in Chechnya. In his statements since 22 October, Maskhadov has 
sought to distance himself from the attackers. Speaking through Zakaev on 25 
October, he "categorically condemned this terrorist act" and said "we are ready to 
cooperate in any way to prevent a bloodbath in Moscow." However, Maskhadov 
never explicitly asked Baraev to release the hostages, nor did he say that the 
hostage taking would only bring terrible retaliation against the members of the 
Chechen nation. Instead, Maskhadov reiterated his willingness to hold talks and 
claimed that Moscow was ultimately responsible for the desperation of the 
Chechen fighters. (See WWW.CHECHENPRESS.COM, 24 & 25 Oct 02) 
 
It seems that the extreme elements that Maskhadov had opposed in 1997 -1999 
but had accepted into the government this summer (chiefly Movladi Udugov, 
Shamil Basaev, and Zelimkhan Yanderbiev) are manipulating Maskhadov and 
radicalizing and degrading the resistance. Hence Maskhadov's union with and 
dependence on the radicals, is not the cause, but rather the result, of this war. If 
Maskhadov really wishes to appear as a responsible and capable leader, he 
must rid himself of these damaging associates. 
 
Aslakhanov: the real alternative? 
Overall, Chechen politicians did not perform very well. The first public reaction 
from a Chechen activist in Moscow came from Adlan Magomedov, a member of 
the pro-Moscow Chechen administration. He offered himself up as a hostage and 
claimed that he commanded a unit of 100 who stood ready to storm the building. 
Later Baraev said he would trade 40 or 50 hostages for Putin-appointee Akhmad 
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Kadyrov. Magomedov is likely to have been together with Kadyrov, and neither of 
them actually went to the theater. A discombobulated Abdul-Khakim Sultygov, 
the presidential representative for human rights in Chechnya, made more stale 
promises to regulate the excesses of the military. (WWW.ECHOMSK.RU, 25 Oct 
02)  
 
The only person who acted like a responsible and courageous leader was Duma 
Deputy and retired MVD General Aslanbek Aslakhanov. He arrived at the theater 
as soon as the news became known on Wednesday night and was the first 
person to enter the theater after it had been seized. He remained in the building 
for hours on 23 October but Baraev rejected him as an intermediary. Aslakhanov 
tried again to launch talks on Friday night, this time accompanied by Yevgeni 
Primakov and Ruslan Aushev.  
 
Before he entered the theater on the first night of the crisis, Aslakhanov spoke to 
journalists and articulated what many Chechens probably were feeling: 
 
"I am ready to do anything so that there will be fewer negative consequences. 
More than that, I am ready to give my life so that no Muscovite will have to 
suffer… 
 
I want to say to those people who took the hostages that this will not bring peace 
closer in Chechnya, and the situation in the Republic will only get worse. I am 
very worried that this event can lead to an explosion of anti-Chechen and anti-
Caucasian sentiment in Moscow... 
 
... what they are doing will bring harm first of all to fellow Chechens. A Chechen 
never went to war against women and there are women in that theater. We have 
to prove to everyone that a Chechen is not a bearded guy covered in garlands of 
ammunition, but a civilized person." (WWW.NEWS.RU, 23 Oct 02) 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Religion & politics: a meeting of Jews and Muslims and the fear of 
extremism 
Religion in Central Asia remains as much about politics and economics as it does 
about faith. But a somewhat surprising series of meetings involving the Eurasian 
Jewish Congress and members of the Kazakh Islamic clergy made Kazakhstan a 
seemingly unlikely spot for Jewish-Muslim dialogue. While the number of Jews in 
Central Asia is minimal now (the largest population lives around Bukhara, 
Uzbekistan), the Congress brought together rabbis from 28 countries to show 
support for an agenda emphasizing that 1) Judaism and Islam are not 
contradictory and 2) Islam is not a faith of violence and terror.  
 
Members of the Congress met with Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev, 
encouraging him to use his influence and good relations within the global Muslim 
community to make Kazakhstan a leading center for Jewish-Muslim dialogue. 
According to Congress President Aleksandr Mashkevich, Nazarbaev was asked 
to be a mediator for global relations between Jews and Muslims because he is 
trusted by the international community and Kazakhstan was "the only CIS 
country that managed to avoid religious extremism and interconfessional 
problems." "President Nazarbaev is positive about this idea and has agreed to 
promote this dialogue," Mashkevich said. (INTERFAX, 1148 GMT, 22 Oct 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-1022, via World News Connection and KHABAR TELEVISION, 
1400 GMT, 21 & 22 Oct 02; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, via lexis-nexis)  
 
Nazarbaev, of course, is a political leader and moderate Muslim whose clout 
rests largely on his personal wealth and the large oil reserves of the country. 
True, there has been relative peace in Kazakhstan where ethnic Kazakhs 
comprise around 50 percent of the population, but in the face of the most 
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ethnically balanced population in Central Asia, that peace could be maintained 
only through a politically pragmatic policy of pluralism. While the countries of 
Central Asia remain guarded against the threat of extremism, Kazakhstan has 
seen less of the Islamic militant manifestations than others because Kazakh 
leaders must be more cautious in their treatment of significant minorities. 
 
Although the allied forces' campaign in Afghanistan is credited with neutralizing 
and scattering one of the largest threats of Islamic militancy, the ghosts of the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (now believed to have merged with other 
groups to create the Islamic Movement of Central Asia) frighten Central Asian 
capitals which react now to some political movements as if all Islamic 
manifestations threaten the social order. Some countries attempt to control Islam 
through the state; Uzbekistan governs religious practice through a state 
committee and the presidentially appointed Grand Mufti of Tashkent, but such 
control breeds underground movements of opposition such as Hizb-ut Tahrir 
(HT). And while the American budget for assistance projects in Central Asia has 
increased over the past year from $240 million to $442 million, there is little sign 
that this increased influx of funds is being felt in the impoverished regions where 
groups such as HT gain their support. (SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 29 Sep 
02; via lexis-nexis.) 
 
Expressions of Islam that are seen as counter to the state agenda are closely 
monitored. In Tajikistan, this has resulted in the closure of 33 of 152 mosques in 
the Isfara region and the corresponding failure to approve 11 of 52 imams for not 
meeting criteria established by the state. While Tajik President Imomali 
Rakhmonov claimed that the Isfara region has twice as many mosques as it does 
schools, the failure of some imams to gain state approval is viewed as political in 
nature. According to Dodojon Yakubov, a regional chairman for the Islamic 
Revival Party (IRP), "the majority of imams who failed registration are those who 
share our views." (KESTON NEWS SERVICE, 18 & 21 Oct 02; via 
www.keston.org) While Muhammadsharif Himmatzoda, deputy leader of the IRP, 
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has claimed that his group supports the idea of globalization over the 
establishment of a caliphate -- clearly distancing the IRP from HT (ASIA-PLUS, 
19 Sep 02; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, via lexis-nexis) -- Tajikistan and others 
view politicized religion as a threat. 
 
In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, according to the recent US State Department 
annual report on religious freedom, non-approved religions (including some 
minority faiths and conservative Islamic groups) face a policy of "state hostility." 
(AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, 7 Oct 02; via lexis-nexis) While the political 
agenda of some conservative Islamic groups poses a serious threat to regional 
stability and may necessitate a response, the fear is that, given the strong 
presidential control of power, legitimate opposition movements may be treated 
indiscriminately by the state as extremist. 
 
In Kazakhstan, two students - one in Almaty and one in Shimkent - recently were 
detained by police for distributing literature on HT. (INTERFAX, 0856 GMT, 15 
Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1015, via World News Connection) Responding to the 
distribution of the pamphlets and the threat of religious extremism, an 
anonymous officer of the Kazakh National Security Committee reported that 
there exists "a certain hidden recruitment process by foreign preachers, 
especially amongst young people in villages, to various forms of radicalism. We 
are shadowing them and trying to suppress them." (MN NOVOSTI NEDELI, 16 
Oct 02; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, via lexis-nexis) Echoing these sentiments, 
Oralbai Abdykarimov, speaker of the Kazakh upper chamber of parliament, said 
that extremist agendas such as those of HT could "somehow slow down 
democratic reforms," thus altering the nature of the state. (INTERFAX, 0851 
GMT, 16 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1016, via World News Connection) The 
message is that extremist opposition will not be tolerated. The fear is that any 
opposition may not be tolerated. 
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Thus, while members of the Eurasian Jewish Congress came to Central Asia to 
propagate the message of Islam's nature of nonviolence and compatibility with 
Judaism, the overall feeling is that political Islam can be violent and must be 
checked accordingly. In terms of Jewish-Muslim relations, the Congress 
meetings were important. With regards to religious pluralism in Central Asia, 
however, they were less significant. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
LATVIA 
Building a government  
Winning seats in the recent Latvian parliamentary elections is proving easier for 
the victorious parties than reaching agreement on the composition of the next 
coalition government. Four center-right political parties -- New Era (26 seats), 
Latvia's First Party (10 seats), Green and Farmers Union (12 seats), and Alliance 
Fatherland and Freedom (7 seats) - have agreed in principle on the formation of 
a coalition government under the leadership of New Era. (BNS, 1217 GMT, 21 
Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1021, via World News Connection) The stumbling point 
appears to be distribution of the 16 ministerial portfolios within the proposed 
government. (BNS, 0723 GMT, 17 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1017, via World 
News Connection) Originally, the primary obstacle to agreement was the 
distribution of the so-called "economic bloc" ministries - economics, agriculture 
and transportation. Each party had made claims on these positions and proposed 
its own candidates. Compromise is difficult because these positions are vital to 
the weaker coalition members seeking sufficient political clout to counter the 
overwhelming strength of the coalition leader, New Era. (BNS, 1217 GMT, 21 Oct 
02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1201, via World News Connection)  
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Negotiations were started, then frozen again on 23 October, when the Green and 
Farmers Union requested still further representation in the new government. The 
group originally had sought the positions of environment protection and 
agriculture, but subsequently increased its demand to include either the 
economics or transport ministries or a combination of the welfare and finance 
ministries. (BNS, 1635 GMT, 23 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1023, via World News 
Connection) If these demands were met, then the Green and Farmers Union 
would receive at least one of the "economic bloc" ministries and a powerful 
position from which to further its political platform of conservative economic and 
agricultural reform within Latvia. 
 
The group insists that it is entitled to a position of importance within the new 
coalition government; however, that view is not shared by the victorious New Era 
party. The leader of New Era (and most likely Prime Minister), Einars Repse, has 
refused categorically to allow his party to yield the position of finance minister. 
This has placed the negotiations once again at an impasse with no further official 
discussions scheduled to take place before 30 October. (BNS, 1635 GMT, 23 
Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1023, via World News Connection) Without an 
agreement as to the distribution of power within the new government, the 
coalition partners are in a precarious position as they prepare for the first plenary 
session of the 8th Saeima on 5 November. 
 
ESTONIA 
Deconstructing parties 
Meanwhile, the results of local elections in Estonia have threatened to change 
the face of Estonian politics. Following the polling on 20 October, two major 
political figures in Estonian politics reportedly have tendered their resignations as 
leaders of their respective parties. Both Toomas Hendrik Ilves - the former 
minister of foreign affairs -- and former Prime Minister Mart Laar now are 
contemplating their respective future in Estonian politics following the poor 
performance of their parties.  
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The local elections, which saw the largest voter turnout ever - 52.37% of 
registered voters - served to demonstrate the growing political power of the new 
party of Res Republica, which emerged as the winner of 21 local governments 
and placed second in 39 rural municipalities. The most noticeable gains made by 
Res Republica came in Tallinn where the newcomer placed second with 21 
percent of the vote and secured 17 seats within the municipal government. (BNS, 
0910 GMT, 21 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1021, via World News Connection) 
 
Ilves attributed the poor performance of his Moderate Party to the perception that 
as the party's leader he is out of touch with the current situation in Estonia. As 
Ilves announced his resignation from the leadership of the party he noted that 
"The Moderates are the only strong social democratic party defending working 
people's interests in Estonia, but I'm regarded as an intellectual with my head in 
the clouds." (BNS, 1047 GMT, 23 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-1023, via World News 
Connection) Ilves does not intend to disappear from Estonian politics altogether; 
he restated his candidacy in the March 2003 parliamentary elections. 
 
Laar, on the other hand, has not made a definitive decision about relinquishing 
his leadership position within the Fatherland Alliance; however, he has called an 
extraordinary party congress for the purpose of discussing his resignation. Laar 
maintains a pessimistic view of the election results because, despite gains 
elsewhere in the country, Fatherland suffered a devastating defeat in the 
politically critical city of Tallinn. The results, Laar said, should serve as "a 
valuable wake-up call, and not solely for the Fatherland Alliance" which must be 
answered by the party's leadership. (BNS, 0734 GMT, 23 Oct 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-1023, via World News Connection) 
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Unless otherwise indicated, all articles appearing in this journal were written especially for 
Analyst. This article was originally published at 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol7/ed0717.html. 
